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The outcome of the 29 March 2009 Turkish local administrations election is 
analyzed in light of economic voting literature, both from historical and geographical 
perspectives.  First, the nationwide vote share of the incumbent party (AKP) is compared to 
what would be expected based on the patterns observed in the past twenty-six National 
Assembly, Senate, and Provincial Council elections held between 1951 and 2007.  For this 
purpose a vote equation is estimated using aggregate nationwide time-series data.  This 
equation takes into account the roles played by economic conditions, political inertia, 
incumbency factors, strategic voting by the electorate, and the political realignments.  
Second, inter-party vote movements between the 2007 parliamentary and the 2009 local 
administrations elections are analyzed, through systems of party vote equations, estimated 
separately for different regions of the country, using cross-provincial data.  The results 
obtained show that the outcome of the 2009 election was predictable on the basis of 
historical patterns.  The vote loses of the AKP is attributable mainly to two transitory 
factors: poor economic conditions prevailing at the time of the election and typical strategic-
voting experienced in local elections.  The party’s vote losses tended to be higher in the east 
than in the west and in provinces where its support is high than where it is low.  The voters 
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1. Introduction  
Until 2009, the Justice and Development Party (AKP) not only came on top 
in every Turkish election it entered since its foundation in 2001, it managed to 
increase its vote share each time as well, reaching 47 percent in 2007 (Table 1).  
 
Table 1: Turkish political parties and their nationwide vote shares  
 
Notes: In paranthesis are the Turkish acronyms of political parties.  The parties which are successors or 
predecessors of each other are put in the same cell to facilitate comparisons.  The Democrat Party (DP) was named 
True Path Party (DYP) prior to the 2007 election.  The Democratic Society Party (DTP) did not enter the 2007 
election officially.  Instead its candidates ran as independents to escape the nationwide 10 percent threshold the 
political parties are required to exceed to be represented in the parliament. The figure shown for the party is the vote 
share of the independent candidates supported by the party.  The Democratic Left Party (DSP) entered the 2007 
election in partnership and under the banner of the Republican People’s Party (CHP).  Other blank spots in the table 
indicate that the party in question did not enter the election.  The  2002 and 2007 elections are for members of 
Turkish Grand National Assembly.  The 2004 and 2009 elections are for members of Provincial General Councils.  
Qualifications for voting are the same in both types of elections. 
Sources: The vote shares of political parties are computed using the data provided by the Turkish Statistical 
Institute (Prime Ministry, the Republic of Turkey) for the 2002, 2004 and 2007 elections and Tuncer (2009) for the 
2009 election.  The vote shares of the independent candidates supported by the Democratic Society Party (DTP) in 
the 2007 election are obtained from Tuncer (2007).   
 
That is why when the party’s vote share fell 8 percentage points in the 29 
March 2009 local administrations election, many analysts treated it as if it was an 
unusual event and a major failure for the AKP despite the party finishing the 
election first and far ahead of all other parties.  Some of them even wondered if that 
date was the beginning of the end for the AKP.  In other words, the party’s vote loss 
was considered a shock, and a permanent one at that.  To assess the validity of this 
assertion however, one needs first to determine whether the outcomes of the 2004 
and 2007 elections, with which the 2009 one is being contrasted, are normal.  This 
would be possible only by considering many more elections in the analysis.  To 
recognize and understand the patterns that will emerge from such an analysis of 
historical data, one needs also a theory of voter behavior.    
  The economic voting literature can provide the theoretical perspective 
needed.  This literature explains why it is more likely for an incumbent party to lose 
POLITICAL PARTIES  2002 2004 2007 2009  
Justice & Development Party (AKP) 34.28      41.67 46.58 38.39 
Felicity Party (SP) 2.49 4.02    2.34 5.20  
Nationalist Action Party (MHP) 8.36 10.45 14.27 15.97  
Republican People’s Party (CHP) 19.39 18.23 20.88 23.08  
Democratic Left Party (DSP) 1.22 2.12   2.85  
True Path Party (DYP)/ Democrat Party  (DP) 9.54 9.97 5.42 3.84  
Motherland Party (ANAP) 5.13 2.50  0.76  
Young Party (GP) 7.25 2.60 3.04   
Democratic People’s Party (DEHAP) 
Social Democratic People’s Party (SHP) 
Democratic Society Party (DTP) 
6.22 5.15 3.84 5.70 
 
Other Parties 5.12 2.56 2.23 3.78  
Independents  1.00 0.73 1.40 0.43 
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votes between two elections than to gain.  Actually one can realize this in the 
Turkish case by just eyeballing the data.  When the AKP raised its vote share in 
2007, relative to 2002, it became the first party in Turkey since 1954 to increase its 
vote share between two parliamentary elections after ruling a full legislative term.1  
When in 2004, it managed to raise its vote share relative to 2002, it became the 
second Turkish party since 1963 (the year when local elections began to be held 
nationwide simultaneously) to increase its votes in a local administrations election, 
relative to the previous parliamentary election.  Actually, if the 1977 local 
administrations election which took place only a few months after a parliamentary 
election is set aside, 2004 was the first time this has happened in Turkey.  The fact 
that these events have occurred so rarely --once per half a century or so-- should be 
sufficient to realize that it was the outcomes of the 2004 and 2007 elections, and not 
the 2009 one, that was atypical.   
The country was going through a major political realignment during the 
2004 and 2007 elections, which began earlier.  Some of the most prominent right-
wing parties were in the process of disappearing or being marginalized during that 
time, and their supporters switching to the AKP.  There were other realignments in 
the past.  To make sense of election results, such realignments need to be taken into 
account as well.  Failure to do is so bound to result in confusion or wrong 
conclusions being reached.  For example, Çarkoğlu (2009 and 2010), Eligür (2009), 
Şekercioğlu (2009), and Şenyuva (2009) choose to study the provincial results of the 
2009 election relative to that of the one held in 2004, as both of these elections were 
for local administrations.  They conclude that the AKP losses were highest in the 
provinces lining the Aegean and Mediterranean coastline.  However, when the 
comparisons are made relative to the 2007 election, the AKP losses appear to be the 
lowest in the very same provinces.  These seemingly contradictory conclusions can 
be explained by the realignment reaching its peak, in western and southern coastal 
provinces in 2004, but in other regions of the country in 2007.     
All of the studies mentioned, besides taking the 2004 election as their main 
reference, base their analyses on descriptive statistics.2  Köksal, Civan and Genç 
(2010) use regression analysis and take 2007 election as its reference point.  
However, they consider vote movements only between three largest parties, ignoring 
smaller ones which get considerable amount of votes especially in local elections.  
Like the others, they ignore elections held prior to 2004. The present paper intends 
to make a contribution by studying the results of the 2009 elections relative to those 
of all elections since 1951, local or parliamentary, and in particular to that of 2007, 
                                                 
1 The Republican People’s Party (CHP) was able to raise its vote share between the 1973 and 
1977 parliamentary elections but that was only after being in power for less than ten months. 
Also, at the time of the 1977 election the party was not the incumbent party.  
2 Also it appears that Çarkoğlu (2009) and Şekercioğlu (2009) do not use the final official 
statistics but the preliminary election data.  For example, they report the nationwide vote 
share of AKP as 34.8 whereas the true figure is 34.4. 
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through application of rigorous statistical methods.  To put it all in perspective, the 
analysis will be carried out in light of the economic voting literature, and will take 
into account the political realignments that have taken place in Turkey.  Besides 
anticipating the direction of the incumbent party’s vote change, questions such as, 
what were its causes, whether it was unusually large, whether it was temporary or 
permanent, how it was distributed among the opposition parties and across the 
country, and whether there was some vote traffic also between the opposition 
parties, will be addressed as well.    
This paper will be organized as follows.  In the next two sections, the 
literature on economic voting, and the political realignments in Turkey will be 
summarized, respectively.  Then in section four, the outcome of the 2009 election 
will be contrasted to what would be expected based on the patterns observed in the 
past twenty-six National Assembly, Senate, and Provincial Council elections held 
between 1951 and 2007, to see how well it fits the historical patterns.  For this 
purpose, a vote equation developed by Akarca and Tansel (2006) and later updated 
by Akarca (2009), which summarizes the time-series data of these elections, will be 
utilized after further updating.  This equation takes into account all of the key factors 
mentioned in the economic voting literature, as well as the political realignments 
that has taken place.  Thus it will allow us to estimate the effect of each of these on 
the vote loss suffered by the AKP.  In section five, cross-provincial data pertaining 
to the 2007 and 2009 elections will be examined and modeled to study the inter-
party vote movements between the two elections.  The destination of the votes lost 
by the AKP will be the focus of this section but vote transfers between other parties 
will also be studied.  Because the vote shifts are likely to vary across regions in a 
country like Turkey which exhibits great deal of regional diversity in terms of 
demographic, economic, social, cultural characteristics, and consequently, in terms 
of political tendencies, this analysis will be carried out separately for each region of 
the country.  In accomplishing the latter, instead of defining the regions in an ad-hoc 
manner, or using a regional division based only on geographical considerations, a 
partition determined through the application of cluster analysis to cross-provincial 
data from the five elections held between 1999 and 2009 by Akarca and Başlevent 
(2010) will be utilized.  Finally, the conclusions reached will be listed in the last 
section.  
 
2. Economic voting   
 
 Understanding the behavior of voters is the key to predicting and 
interpreting such things as election outcomes, longevity of governments, election 
timing, political fragmentation, and political business cycles.  Consequently, a field 
has developed over the last four decades or so, analyzing how voters vote, referred 
to as economic voting.  Borrowing the definition of Lewis-Beck and Paldam (2000), 
“economic voting is a field that mixes economics and political science and does so 
by means of econometrics.”  In view of the detailed surveys by Lewis-Beck (1988), 
Nannestad and Paldam (1994), Norpoth (1996), Lewis-Beck and Paldam (2000), 
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Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier (2000), and Akarca and Tansel (2006 and 2007), only a 
summary and not another survey of the literature on economic voting will be 
presented here.   
 According to this literature, most of the voters align themselves with a party 
that they identify as representing their interests and ideology.  Thus they tend to 
choose the same party they voted for in the previous election.  This creates a great 
amount of inertia in the political system.3  However, a portion of incumbent party 
supporters vote strategically.  They shift their votes to other parties to check the 
power of the incumbent party.  This tendency is stronger in elections which give a 
chance to voters to warn the government without toppling it, such as in midterm 
congressional elections in the U.S., European Parliament elections in European 
Union countries, and local administrations or parliamentary by elections in Turkey.  
Consequently, parties which control the central government, tend to do poorly in 
these types of elections.  Existence of threshold regulations in parliamentary general 
elections, such as the minimum 10 percent nationwide vote share requirement to 
gain representation in the Turkish Grand National Assembly, contributes to this 
effect as well.  Some of the small party supporters, who vote strategically for one of 
the major parties in domestic parliamentary elections not to waste their vote, return 
to their first choices in the elections where no such handicaps apply. 
   Ruling involves making some compromises and unpopular or bad decisions, 
and shelving some promises.  These cost incumbent parties some votes as well.  The 
“cost of ruling”, as some refers to it in the literature, rises with the time spent in 
power, as disappointments with the incumbent parties accumulate.  On the other 
hand, incumbency has its advantages too, and it can offset part of the losses due to 
strategic-voting and cost of ruling.  Besides things like access to the media and name 
recognition, it includes ability to indulge in transfer activities such as providing 
services, subsidies and patronage, and picking locations of government investment 
and public work projects, to benefit those who support incumbent parties.   
 The economy provides another way for an incumbent party to offset the vote 
losses due to strategic voting and cost of ruling.  The voters reward incumbents for a 
good economic performance, and punish them for a bad one.  However, in making 
their economic evaluations, they tend to be retrospective and myopic.  They look 
back no more than a year or so.  This and the fact that they give more weight to 
growth than inflation, give incentives to governments to conduct expansionary 
economic policies before an election and then switch to restrictive policies after the 
election to fight their inflationary effects.  The governments are also likely to 
postpone the necessary adjustments to the economy at least until after elections.  In 
short, the behavior of the voters may be at the root of political business cycles 
observed in so many countries.  Voters judge governments ego-tropically as well as 
                                                 
3 However, political realignments occur occasionally when substantial number of voters 
changes their party allegiances, as have happened in Turkey a couple of times.  These will be 
discussed in detail below. 
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socio-tropically.  In other words, they consider not only changes in their own 
economic well-being but others’ as well.  The latter may be out of concern for their 
fellow countrymen but also because they may be using government’s nationwide 
performance as an indicator of its competence.  
 Empirical findings show that, at the national level, the gains from good 
economic performance (assuming that that is the case) and incumbency advantage 
rarely make up for vote losses between two parliamentary elections due to strategic-
voting and cost of ruling.  That is why in democratic countries, the power eventually 
changes hands.  If the incumbent party has come to power with a high vote share, it 
can remain in power for more than one term, despite losing ground.  This was the 
case in Turkey with the Democrat Party in the fifties, with the Justice Party in the 
sixties, and with the Motherland Party (ANAP) in the eighties.  When the incumbent 
party is relatively weak to start with, it remains in power at best one term,  elections 
are often called way before their constitutionally mandated times, and coalition 
governments become the norm, as was the case in Turkey during the seventies and 
nineties.  It is rare for an incumbent party to raise its vote share after serving a full 
legislative term.  As mentioned above, when it happened to the Justice and 
Development Party (AKP) in 2007, it was the first time this has occurred in Turkey 
since 1954.  It occurred not only because economic conditions prevailing in 2007 
were very good and together with the incumbency advantage it more than offset the 
party’s vote losses due to strategic-voting and cost of ruling, but also because they 
coincided with the political realignment process that was going on at the time.  
Between 1999 and 2007 a large portion of voters deserted the parties they identified 
as representing their interests and ideology, in favor of the AKP.  There were other 
realignments in Turkish politics besides this one.  The economic voting literature 
focuses on vote changes at the margin, but does not address such massive shifts in 
party loyalties which occur from time to time.  However the latter has to be taken 
into account to isolate the other effects and to understand the political developments 
properly.  The causes of the realignments mentioned are beyond the scope of the 
present paper.  However a brief discussion of them would motivate the terms which 
will be entered into the vote equation to account for the realignments.  Furthermore, 
such a discussion will provide a better understanding of the current political scene as 
well.  
  
3. Political realignments in Turkey   
 
When choices denied to them before become available, when the needs and 
outlook of voters change but their parties fail to adapt, or when their parties change 
in a manner that deviates from their interests and beliefs, voters shift their 
allegiances to other parties.  These occur quite infrequently and involve much larger 
and permanent vote movements than the marginal and transitory changes discussed 
in the previous section.  Three such realignments have taken place in Turkey since it 
entered multi-party democracy in 1946.  Two of these can be classified as major and 
one as minor.  The first of these occurred between 1946 and 1950 (and perhaps 
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extended to 1954) when the country entered the era of multi-party democracy. Then, 
large amount of votes shifted from the Republican People’s Party, the sole party 
allowed since 1924, to the new Democrat Party.  Since this period lies outside the 
sample period examined in the present study, it is not necessary to discuss it here in 
detail.4   
A much smaller and shorter-lived realignment has occurred between 1973 
and 1975.  Before the 1973 election, a political faction split from the Justice Party, 
the major incumbent party then, and formed the Democratic Party.  This new party 
siphoned off considerable amount of votes from the Justice Party in the 1973 
election.  However, these votes largely returned back to the party in the following 
election in 1975 and the Democratic Party virtually disappeared from the political 
scene after that.   
The second major realignment, which manifested itself after 1999, but in 
hindsight appears to have begun earlier, is of the greatest importance for the current 
study.  After experiencing rampant corruption, poor economic performance, and 
constant infighting under various coalition governments during the preceding 
decade, in the November 2002 election, voters ousted all of the parties which had 
entered the parliament in 1999.  Included among these were the Motherland Party 
(ANAP), which held the premiership during 1983-1991 and 1997-1999, the True 
Path Party (DYP) and the Democratic Left Party (DSP) which led governments 
during the 1991-1996 and 1999-2002 periods, respectively, and the Nationalist 
Action Party (MHP) which was part of the ruling coalition between 1999 and 2002 
together with the DSP and the ANAP.  None of them were able to surpass the ten 
percent nationwide vote share threshold required to be represented in the Turkish 
Grand National Assembly.  In addition, the Virtue Party (FP), the successor to the 
Welfare Party (RP) - which was the only other party to lead a government during the 
nineties - was already banned in 2001 by the Constitutional Court, just as its 
predecessor.  The combined vote share of the parties mentioned was 81 percent in 
1999 but only 24 percent in 2002.  Only 11 percent of the legislators elected in 1999 
made it to the 2002 parliament.  Of these parties, so far only the MHP has been able 
to engineer a come-back.  The party’s vote share of 16 percent in 2009 was almost 
the same as it was in 1999.  The rest of the parties continued to lose ground after 
2002, seeing a further decline in their combined share from 16 to 7 percent by 2009.  
The ANAP did not contest the 2007 election and received less than one percent of 
the votes in 2009.  The DSP entered the 2007 election under the banner of the CHP, 
and received less than 3 percent of the votes in 2009.  The DYP, now named the 
Democrat Party (DP), has fared a little better with almost a 4 percent vote share in 
2009.   
                                                 
4 The 1946 election is excluded because it is considered to be not fair.  The outcome of the 
1950 election is used in the vote equation presented in the next section, but as a value for the 
lagged dependent variable which enters the model as an independent variable.    
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In hindsight, the building of voter frustration was quite evident.  In each of 
the parliamentary elections since 1987, a different party finished first.  Since 1991, 
each election produced a coalition government involving a different combination of 
parties.  After observing no change in party leaderships and policies, despite signal 
sent through diminishing vote shares, voters finally lost faith in most of the 
established parties.  Major incompetence and rampant corruption exposed by the two 
major earthquakes in 1999, implicating both the government and the opposition 
parties may have acted as the straw that broke the camel’s back.  In 2002 they cast 
their votes overwhelmingly for three parties: the Justice and Development Party 
(AKP), the Young Party (GP), and the Republican People’s Party (CHP).  The first 
two of those were formed shortly before the election, and the last one had been out 
of the parliament during the previous legislative term, having received less than ten 
percent of the votes in the 1999 election.  Of these the GP turned out to be a flash in 
the pan.  Its 7 percent share in 2002 fell to 3 percent in 2007 and to zero in 2009 
when it did not even participate in the election.  The CHP vote share remained more-
or-less constant, hovering around 20 percent.  Its 2009 vote share was slightly over 
23 percent.   
 The AKP, which emerged from the ashes of the banned FP, captured the 
lion’s share of the voters who deserted their former parties.  The party’s disavowal 
of its Islamist roots, embrace of political and economic reforms necessary for 
Turkey’s accession to the European Union (EU), the non-corrupt and populist image 
of its mayors at the local level, its message of hope, and the likelihood of it forming 
a single-party government, all appealed to the electorate which deserted the right-
wing ANAP, DYP and MHP.5  The Felicity Party (SP), the other party rooted in the 
FP, towed the old party line and received only a couple of percent of the votes, as 
opposed to the AKP which captured about 34 percent of it.  Despite the Islamist 
background of many of its leaders, the AKP ruled essentially as a moderate, center-
right, conservative democrat party would: committed to democracy, free market 
economy and Turkey’s EU membership.  This dispelled some of the lingering 
skepticism concerning the genuineness of the party leaders’ transformation, and led 
more of the liberal minded voters to join its ranks. Interestingly, the party was able 
to do all that without alienating much of its traditional base.  Over the last two 
decades that base, while holding on to its basic conservative values, got increasingly 
richer, less isolated, better informed, more entrepreneurial, more modernized, more 
urbanized, and more integrated with other parts of Turkey and the rest of the world, 
largely as a result of the introduction of internet, ending of the state monopoly on 
television and radio, major improvements in the highway and telecommunication 
systems, and the market-oriented reforms instituted in the eighties by Turgut Özal, 
the prime-minister then.  The leadership which formed the AKP recognized this 
evolution in the society better than all other parties, and transformed.  Consequently 
                                                 
5 For more details on the sources of the AKP votes the reader is referred to Başlevent and 
Akarca (2009) and Akarca and Başlevent (2009).  
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they were able to capture the supporters of the parties which failed to adapt despite 
warnings given by the electorate in the form of dwindling vote shares.  
The events that led to the calling of the 22 July 2007 election, four months 
before the end of the regular legislative term, have exacerbated the realignment 
process.  Series of mass protest rallies were organized against the AKP in the Spring 
of 2007, to stop it from electing its own candidate as the new president, a thinly 
veiled threat by the military was posted on their web site on April 27, 2007, called 
the e-ultimatum by the media, threatening to topple them if they do, and a highly 
controversial decision was given by the Constitutional Court two days later 
requiring participation of two-thirds of the deputies in the first round of the 
presidential balloting in the parliament, practically taking away the ability of the 
AKP to elect its candidate without the aid of other parties.  When the two center-
right parties ANAP and DP decided not to participate in the presidential balloting so 
that the quorum required by the Constitutional Court could not be reached, they 
disappointed many of their remaining hard core supporters, who finally deserted 
these parties.  In a way what happened can be looked upon as a reverse kind of 
strategic voting, one where the opposition party supporters came to the aid of the 
incumbent party, to check the power exercised by the military and the judiciary 
through undemocratic means.  However for ANAP and DP, which come from a 
tradition of resisting power of the state establishment and opposing interventions by 
the civilian and military bureaucracy in the rightful domain of elected officials, to 
side with the military was seen as a fundamental deviation.6  Thus their loss of 
support turned out to be permanent and, not transitory as would be the case with 
strategic voting.  The AKP expanded its vote share to 47 percent in the 2007 
parliamentary election.  It declined to 38 percent in 2009 local administrations 
election, but as will be shown below, this can be attributed to the poor economic 
conditions prevailing then, to strategic voting, and to cost of ruling, and not to any 
new realignment.  In short, a mass shift in votes has occurred between 1999 and 
2007, which was far more than what could be attributed to usual depreciation in the 
political capital of the ruling parties or to voter response to the economic conditions.   
The last realignment process appears essentially to have come to an end by 
2009.  Of the four parties which got left out of the parliament in 2002 due to not 
surpassing the 10 percent threshold, the MHP, DSP, ANAP and DP (then DYP), 
only the first one was able to engineer a come back.  The combined vote share of the 
rest and the FP which got closed by the Constitutional Court in 2001 declined from 
63 percent in 2002 to 7 percent in 2009.  Their vote share in 2009 was about the 
                                                 
6 In fact for the ANAP this was second such offense.  The party cooperated with the military 
in 1997 to topple another government involving the FP and the DP (then DYP) in an 
undemocratic manner.  Its vote share was on a sharp decline since then.  The DP vote share 
was around 10-12 percent until the 2007 election but nosedived beginning with that election 
when it committed its first such offense.  
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same as in 2007.7  Therefore it appears that the vote shares of these parties have 
stabilized and are not big enough anymore to make a major difference.  The newly 
formed GP which captured 7 percent of the vote in 2002 turned out to be a flash in 
the pan.  Its share fell to 3 percent in 2007 and to zero in 2009 when it did not even 
participate in the election.  As will be shown in section five, the small number of 
voters who supported this party in 2007 went to two of the opposition parties in 
2009.  In short, we can say that the realignment was only a minor factor in the 2009 
election and did not affect the incumbent party votes significantly.  The analysis in 
the next section will provide further support in this direction.   
 
4. 2009 election in historical perspective 
 
A vote equation which accounts over time for all of the factors mentioned in the 
previous two sections is the following:  
 
Vt= a + b D73-75t + c D02t + d D04-07t + f Vt-k + m Δ(Lt + Bt) .Vt-k + n rt .Vt-k+u gt  + v pt + et  
(1) 
 
Where ΔXt = Xt- - Xt-k , and the variables are defined as follows: 
 
Vt,: vote share of the major incumbent party in election held at time t, 
 
Vt-k : vote share of the major incumbent party in the previous election held k years                     
earlier 
 
gt : growth rate of the per capita real GDP during the one-year period preceding the  
     election held at time t  (henceforth referred to as the growth rate) 
 
pt  : inflation rate in GDP implicit price deflator during the one-year period preceding  
      the election held at time t (henceforth referred to as the inflation rate) 
 
rt :number of years the major incumbent party was in power since the previous 
 election 
 
Lt : a dummy variable, which takes on the value of one if the election involved is for    
      local administrations, and zero otherwise 
 
Bt : a dummy variable, which takes on the value of one if the election involved is a   
      National Assembly by-election only (that is, not held simultaneously with a   
      Senate election), and zero otherwise  
                                                 
7 It is assumed that the vote share of the DSP in 2007, which entered the election in that year 
under the banner of the CHP, was around 2-3 percent, as it was in 2004 and 2009.  
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D73-75t : a dummy variable, which takes on the value of +1 in 1973, -1 in 1975, and    
                zero in all other years 
 
D02t :      a dummy variable, which takes on the value of one in 2002, and zero in all   
        other  years 
 
D04-07t: a dummy variable, which takes on the value of one in 2004 and in 2007,    
               and zero in all other years. 
The parameter a represents the impact of incumbency advantage, b, the 
1973-1975 realignment, c and d, the 2002-2007 realignment, 1-f, strategic-voting in 
parliamentary general elections, m, the additional strategic-voting in local and 
parliamentary by elections, n the cost of ruling per year, u and v, the economic 
conditions.    
 The above model is essentially the same as the one built by Akarca and 
Tansel (2006).  The only difference is the additional dummy variable used here 
which takes the value of unity in 2004 and 2007.  In other words, here it is assumed 
that the political realignment which begun before the 2002 election has continued 
until 2007.  2002 is treated as when the political earthquake took place and the two 
elections succeeding it, as when aftershocks continued.  In Akarca (2009) the 
dummy variable in question takes the value of one in 2004 but not also in 2007, 
implying that the realignment ended in 2004 instead of 2007. 
 Ordinary Least Squares estimates of the parameters of equation (1), obtained 
by fitting it to the nationwide time-series data covering 1951-2007 period, are 
presented in Table 2.  The table also includes the t-statistics for the parameter 
estimates, the R-square, the adjusted R-square, and F values, for judging the fit of 
the equation, and Durbin’s (1970) h and White’s (1980) chi-square statistics and 
their probability values to check for autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity in the 
residuals and any misspecification in the equations considered. The equation fits the 
data exceptionally well.  The data used in fitting the equation is given in the 
appendix with more precise definitions of the variables.  Compared to the one used 
by Akarca and Tansel (2006), this data set excludes the 1946 election which was 
considered by many, correctly so, to be unfair.  On the other hand, it includes 
observations on the 2007 parliamentary election which obviously was not available 
in 2006, and the 1977 election for local administrations which was left out by 
Akarca and Tansel because it took place too close to a parliamentary election.  The 
growth and inflation rates associated with the 1999, 2002, 2004 and 2007 elections 
also differ. For those the new GDP series is used here.  Akarca (2009) incorporates 
all of these changes.  The estimates presented there are slightly different due to the 
additional dummy variable not taking a value of unity in 2007. 
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Table 2:  Estimated incumbent party vote share equation: time-series data 
 
Variables Coefficient estimate 
Constant 8.000  (1.66)  
Vt-k 
0.854 
(8.41) 
D73-75t 
-7.724 
(2.96) 
D02t 
-18.125 
(4.95) 
D04-07t 
6.423 
(2.57) 
∆(Lt+Bt).Vt-k  
-0.060 
(2.71) 
rt .Vt-k 
-0.052 
(2.96) 
gt 
0.768 
(2.90) 
pt 
-0.120 
(3.23) 
F 
Prob > F 
57.02 
0.00 
Durbin-h       
Prob  >  h 
-0.79 
0.22 
White Chi-square 
Prob > Chi-square 
25.32 
0.61 
R-square 
Adj. R-square 
0.96 
0.95 
Notes:  The dependent variable in the regression is Vt , the vote share of the sole incumbent party in 
case of single-party governments and of the major incumbent party in case of coalitions.  For the 
definitions of variables, see Section 4, and for their measurement, the notes to Table A-1 in the 
appendix. The data covers 26 local and parliamentary elections between 1951 and 2007.  The Ordinary 
Least Squares method is used in the estimation of equations.  The dark-shaded cells indicate 
significance of the parameter estimate at one percent level, and the light-shaded cell, at ten percent 
level, in one-tailed tests.    
Source:  Author’s computations, using data given in Akarca (2009). 
 
 According to the model estimated, each percentage point increase in the 
growth rate of per capita real GDP during the one-year period before the election, is 
expected to raise the share of the major incumbent party in the total vote by 0.77 
percentage points.8  Each percentage point increase in the inflation rate during the 
                                                 
8 Two cross-section studies on Turkey, one macro and one micro, find a strong link between 
the economy and the election outcomes as well.  Akarca and Tansel (2007) using cross-
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same period, on the other hand, lowers this share by 0.12 percentage points or by 
about one-sixth of that of the growth rate.  Thus an incentive exists for Turkish 
governments to adopt populist policies before elections especially considering the 
fact that economic conditions prevailing more than a year before the election does 
not matter.  As long as it does not generate an additional inflation exceeding about 6 
percentage points, a stimulation of the economy that results in a percentage point 
increase in the growth rate is advantageous to the main incumbent party.   
 The coefficient of Vt-k is close to unity, indicating a strong political inertia.  
However the parameter is less than unity, consistent with strategic-voting.  The 
model predicts that the major incumbent party is expected to lose 14.6 percent of its 
vote in the previous election of the same type for simply being the incumbent.9  This 
loss is estimated to be 20.6 percent in local and by elections that follow regular 
parliamentary elections, and 8.6 percent in regular parliamentary elections that 
follow local or by elections.  In addition, the major incumbent party’s vote share is 
anticipated to depreciate at the rate of 5.2 percent per year while in office.  Thus in 
between two parliamentary elections held four or five years apart, the maximum 
length allowed before 1983 and since 2007, and during 1983-2007, respectively, the 
primary ruling party is expected to lose 35-41 percent of its vote share.  This may 
explain why the elections in Turkey are held almost always way before their 
constitutionally mandated time and why the tenures of governments were often short 
except in few instances when the major incumbent party’s vote share was quite high 
initially.  This much loss is hard to compensate with good economic performance 
and the incumbency advantage estimated to be about 8 percentage points. That is 
why it is very rare for a party to raise its vote share after ruling a full legislative 
term. As mentioned above, it occurred only twice since 1946, when the Turkish 
multi-party democracy begun.   
  It seems that any advantage a ruling party enjoys in local elections through 
its ability to channel central government resources to those local administrations 
under the party’s control, is more than cancelled through strategic voting by the 
electorate. Unless local elections are held very soon after a parliamentary election 
and thus with less erosion in votes due to cost of ruling, it is highly unlikely for an 
incumbent party to raise its votes in a local election relative to the previous 
parliamentary election.  Although this finding is contrary to the widely held view by 
                                                                                                                              
provincial data, show that in 1995 incumbent party votes in Turkey tended to rise in areas 
where growth rate a year before the election was higher and to fall in those where the growth 
rate was lower.  Growth rate more than a year before the election is found to not matter in its 
outcome.  Akarca and Başlevent (2009) using individual data, show that economic 
evaluations – especially retrospective ones – had a strong association with the party choice of 
Turkish voters in 2007. 
9 This result is corroborated in micro studies.  For example the survey data used by Akarca 
and Başlevent (2009) indicate that of the people who voted for AKP in 2002, over 80 percent 
voted for this party again in 2007, and that they constituted more than three-fourths of the 
party’s supporters in 2007. 
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the Turkish media and public, even a casual eyeballing of the data presented in the 
appendix shows that out of the eight local administrations elections, in six, the major 
incumbent party’s vote share has decreased relative to the previous national 
assembly election.  Of the two exceptional local administrations elections, the one in 
1977 took place only a few months after the parliamentary election and the one in 
2004, coincided with a political realignment taking place, as mentioned before.   
   The political realignment has cost the DSP, the major incumbent party in 
2002, 18.1 percent of the total vote.  The AKP on the other hand is estimated to have 
received about 6.4 percent more of the total vote in 2004 and 2007, due to political 
realignment.  Similarly, it appears that the fragmentation of the major incumbent 
party in 1973 caused it to lose 7.7 percent of the total vote, which it was able to 
recoup in 1975.   
 One way to determine whether the outcome of the 2009 election fits the 
historical patterns is to predict the outcome based on past patterns and compare that 
with the actual realization.  This is done in Table 3.  The prediction, or in other 
words, the expected vote share of AKP given the political and economic factors at 
the time of the election, is right on target.10  Thus it can be argued that voter 
behavior in the 2009 election was not different than in previous elections held under 
similar conditions.  Once the historical patterns are taken into account, there is 
nothing surprising about the outcome of the 29 March 2009 election.   
 Table 3 gives us some clues also about the key sources of AKP vote loss in 
2009.  What were different in this election than the one in 2007 were the economic 
conditions and the extra strategic-voting in local elections.  If the growth and 
inflation rate figures in the table were replaced with the corresponding rates 
prevailing prior to the 2007 election, the expected vote share would have been 4.2 
percentage points higher.  That can be taken as an estimate of how much the 
economy has cost the party.  Also, had the 2009 election been a parliamentary one 
as in 2007, the strategic-voting against the incumbent party would have been 2.8 
percentage points less.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
10 It should be pointed out that this is not an artifact created by the slight modification made 
in the model, relative to Akarca (2009).  The latter model yields a prediction of 39.23 when 
the actual realizations of growth and inflation were used instead of their expectations.   
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Table 3:  Expected vs actual vote share of AKP in 2009 (percentage points) 
Vote share in 2007                                                                                  46.58  
Impact of 
   Strategic-voting    
 Usual                      - 0.146 X 46.58 = - 6.80       
Local Election            - 0.060 X 46.58 = - 2.79     
   Cost of ruling                           - 0.052 X 46.58 X 1.75 = - 4.24  
   Incumbency Advantage                                            + 8.00 
   Growth                           + 0.768 X -1.2 = - 0.92  
   Inflation                            - 0.120 X 10.4 = - 1.25 
Total Adjustments                                           - 8.00  
Expected Vote share in 2009                                                      38.58 
Actual Vote share in 2009                                                                      38.39 
“Surprise”                                - 0.19   
Source: Authors’ computations based on the vote equation presented in Table 2 
 
5. 2009 election in geographical perspective  
 
 With cross-provincial data, vote equations can be estimated for each 
individual party, which is not possible with time-series data.11  When, lagged vote 
shares of all major parties are included on the right-hand-side of these equations, the 
vote traffic between any two parties can be measured, controlling for all other inter-
party vote shifts.  In particular, the coefficient of the lagged AKP vote share in the 
vote equations of the opposition parties will help us determine which of them tended 
to benefit from votes lost by the incumbent party in 2009.   
 However, three points have to be taken into account in performing the cross-
provincial analysis.  First, the effects of strategic-voting, cost of ruling, and national 
economic conditions can not be measured individually, using cross-section data, as 
the variables representing them will show no variation across observations.  
Although the impact of local economic conditions is measurable in principle, as was 
done in Akarca and Tansel (2007) in regards to the 1995 parliamentary election, due 
to lack of income data at provincial level since 2001, that is not possible for the 
2009 election.  Second, factors which can be ignored more easily in the aggregate 
data, can not be in the analysis of more disaggregated data.  Due to differences in 
their socio-economic, demographic, cultural, and other characteristics, voting 
patterns are likely to vary across the regions of the country.  Thus each region needs 
to be studied separately.  Third, it is not practical to include every party’s vote share 
on the right hand side of vote equations, as that would cause multicollinearity.  
                                                 
11 Due to frequent party closures as a result of military coups and Constitutional Court 
decisions, consistent time-series of sufficient length on political parties are non-existent in 
Turkey. 
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Limited number of observations in each region would not permit inclusion of too 
many independent variables anyway.  
 There is not much that can be done in regards to the first issue.  However, 
although the effects of strategic-voting, cost of ruling, and national economic 
conditions can not be measured individually, an estimate of their combined impact 
can be obtained through the coefficient of the lagged vote share of the AKP in its 
own equation.   
   To address the second issue, the provinces are separated into three groups 
and separate estimates are obtained for each.  For this purpose the results of a study 
by Akarca and Başlevent, (2010) who obtained 3-way and 5-way partitions of the 
country applying cluster analysis (k-means method) to cross-provincial data is 
utilized.  This study shows that 3-way partition adequately captures the main 
political cleavages in Turkey but the 5-way partition brings out differences in 
nuance within each main division.  Here the 3-way division is preferred because it 
sufficiently captures the variation in voter behavior across the country, and the 5-
way partition would result in too few observations in some regions to run reliable 
regressions.  Akarca and Başlevent repeat their analysis for each of the five elections 
between 1999 and 2009.  Remarkably, each of the three regions that emerge in each 
election contains almost the same provinces.  By placing the few provinces which 
change regions between elections, in the cluster in which they appear most, they 
obtain composite groupings.  These should be more reliable than a partition based on 
one election alone.  That is why the composite map, shown in Figure 1, is used 
here.12   
Figure 1 Regions with different voting patterns in Turkey 
 
Notes: For each of the five elections between 1999 and 2009, the provinces are grouped into three, using cluster 
analysis (k-means method).  Going from west to east, the clusters are numbered 1 through 3 (colored black, dark 
grey, and light gray, respectively in the map).  The provinces which changed clusters between elections are placed in 
the region in which they appeared most.  A tie occurred only in the case of Kars.  The province appeared once in 
                                                 
12 It would make little difference if the map obtained for the 2009 election was used instead.  
The composite map differs from the one for the 2009 election only in the case of four 
provinces out of eighty-one. 
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region 1, twice in region 2 and twice in region 3.  It was placed in region 2, based on the weighted average.  In 2007, 
58.6 percent of  all valid votes were cast in region 1, 34.1 percent in region 2, and 7.3 percent in region 3.  The 
regions include the following provinces: 
Region 1 (29 provinces):  Adana, Amasya, Ankara, Antalya, Artvin, Aydın, Balıkesir, Bilecik, Burdur, Çanakkale, 
Denizli, Edirne, Eskişehir, Hatay, Mersin, İstanbul, İzmir, Kırklareli, Kırşehir, Kocaeli, Manisa, Muğla, Sinop, 
Tekirdağ, Uşak, Zonguldak, Bartın,Ardahan and Yalova. 
Region 2 (38 provinces): Adıyaman, Afyon, Bolu, Bursa, Çankırı, Çorum, Elazığ, Erzincan, Erzurum, Gaziantep, 
Giresun, Gümüşhane, Isparta, Kars, Kastamonu, Kayseri, Konya, Kütahya, Malatya, Kahramanmaraş, Nevşehir, 
Niğde, Ordu, Rize, Sakarya, Samsun, Sivas, Tokat, Trabzon, Yozgat, Aksaray, Bayburt, Karaman, Kırıkkale, 
Karabük, Kilis, Osmaniye and Düzce.  
Region 3 (14 provinces): Ağrı, Bingöl, Bitlis, Diyarbakır, Hakkari, Mardin, Muş, Siirt, Tunceli, Şanlıurfa, Van, 
Batman, Şırnak and Iğdır.   
Source: Akarca and Başlevent (2010).  
Going from west to east, the first cluster which is painted black, follows the 
Mediterranean, Aegean and Marmara coasts (except Bursa province on the latter) 
and juts out from eastern Marmara Sea inland all the way to Kırşehir.  It also 
includes provinces which are adjacent to the coastal ones along the Aegean, and a 
few provinces scattered along the Black Sea.  The 29 provinces in this region, where 
58.6 percent of the valid votes were cast in 2007, represent the wealthiest, most-
modern, most-educated, most-urbanized and most cosmopolitan part of Turkey.  The 
third cluster, painted light gray, covers a triangular corner of southeastern and 
middle-eastern Anatolian provinces.  It includes 14 provinces where 7.3 percent of 
the valid votes were cast in 2007.  This region is relatively the poorest and least 
developed part of Turkey, populated heavily by ethnic Kurds.  The second region, 
colored dark gray, is composed of 38 provinces where 34.1 percent of the valid 
votes were cast in 2007.  It lies in between the other two regions not only 
geographically, but in regards to income and education levels, modernity, and 
conservatism as well.13   
 To address the third issue, only the major flows in vote traffic are taken into 
account.  On the right hand side of each party’s equation only the 2007 vote share of 
that party and those of the parties with vote losses in the region exceeding one 
percentage point are entered.  In each region, vote equations are considered only for 
those parties which received at least four percent of the regional vote either in 2007 
or in 2009.  The CHP and DSP, which participated in the 2007 election as partners, 
are treated as if they are one party.  A party’s acronym followed by “09” is used to 
represent its 2009 vote share and its acronym followed by “07” to represent its 2007 
vote share.  The vote equations for each region are estimated as a Seemingly 
Unrelated Regression System, using the procedure of Zellner (1962), to achieve 
greater statistical efficiency. 
 The distribution of votes among parties in 2007 and 2009 for the three 
regions are given in Tables 4 through 6.  The tables show that the AKP is the only 
party with significant presence across the board.  However it has lost ground in all 
three regions with losses rising from west to east, and from the coastal areas to the 
interior of the country.   
 
                                                 
13 See Table 2 of Akarca and Başlevent (2010) for socio-economic and demographic 
characteristics of the clusters. 
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Table 4: Vote shares of Turkish political parties in Region 1 
Notes: The information given in the notes to Table 1 and Figure 1 applies here as well.   
Sources:  The same as Table 1.                                            
 
 
Table 5: Vote shares of Turkish political parties in Region 2 
  Notes: The information given in the notes to Table 1 and Figure 1 applies here as well.   
  Sources: The same as Table 1.                                            
 
 
 
 
 
POLITICAL PARTIES  2002 2004 2007 2009 
 
Justice & Development Party (AKP) 29.72 39.57 39.98 35.07 
Felicity Party (SP) 2.12 2.98 2.10 4.06  
Nationalist Action Party (MHP) 8.39 9.56 15.49 15.84  
Republican People’s Party (CHP) 24.47 23.34 27.29 31.12  
Democratic Left Party (DSP) 1.41 2.15  3.42 
True Path Party (DYP)/ 
Democrat Party  (DP)  
9.51 9.16 5.61 3.43 
 
Motherland Party (ANAP) 4.95 2.67  0.14 
Young Party (GP) 9.17 3.22 4.10   
Democratic People’s Party (DEHAP) 
Social Democratic People’s Party (SHP) 
Democratic Society Party (DTP) 
4.22 4.35 2.29 3.15 
 
Other Parties 5.79 2.79 1.94 2.01  
Independents  0.25 0.21 1.20 1.76 
POLITICAL PARTIES  2002 2004 2007 2009 
 
Justice & Development Party (AKP) 45.39 46.96 57.53 45.84  
Felicity Party (SP) 2.94 5.34 2.98 6.68  
Nationalist Action Party (MHP) 9.10 13.58 14.49 19.50  
Republican People’s Party (CHP) 13.16 12.49 13.40 13.84  
Democratic Left Party (DSP) 0.96 1.52  2.22  
True Path Party (DYP)/ 
Democrat Party  (DP)  
9.66 11.08 5.23 4.21 
 
Motherland Party (ANAP) 5.07 2.17  0.40 
Young Party (GP) 5.22 1.68 1.77  
Democratic People’s Party (DEHAP) 
Social Democratic People’s Party (SHP) 
Democratic Society Party (DTP) 
2.84 1.42 0.86 1.26 
 
Other Parties 4.47 3.07 2.11 2.34  
Independents  1.19 0.69 1.63 3.71 
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Table 6: Vote shares of Turkish political parties in Region 3 
Notes: The information given in the notes to Table 1 and Figure 1 applies here as well.   
Sources:  The same as Table 1.       
 
This can be seen more clearly in Figure 2, in which provinces where the 
AKP either gained votes or lost less than the national average are colored black.  
Most of these are colored black (i.e. are in region 1) in Figure 1 also.   
 
Figure 2:  Change in the AKP Vote Share between 2007 and 2009  
 
Source: Author’s computations utilizing data sources given in Table 1. 
 
The provinces where the party’s vote losses were more than twice that of its 
losses nationally are painted in light gray.  The provinces which lie in between the 
two extremes are colored in dark grey.  The pattern observed is consistent with the 
economic voting literature.  This literature implies that, although the incumbency 
POLITICAL PARTIES  2002 2004 2007 2009 
Justice & Development Party (AKP) 18.71 32.82 48.29 32.25 
Felicity Party (SP) 3.39 5.67 1.29 7.47 
Nationalist Action Party (MHP) 4.69 2.48 3.49 2.65 
Republican People’s Party (CHP) 8.47 6.61 4.54 2.55 
Democratic Left Party (DSP) 0.88 0.56  1.27 
True Path Party (DYP)/ 
Democrat Party  (DP)  
9.27 10.86 4.77 5.34 
Motherland Party (ANAP) 6.89 3.04  2.68 
Young Party (GP) 1.45 2.28 0.44  
Democratic People’s Party (DEHAP) 
Social Democratic People’s Party (SHP) 
Democratic Society Party (DTP) 
37.82 28.63 29.93 41.92 
Other Parties 2.42 2.24 1.57 2.68 
Independents  6.01 4.81 5.68 1.19 
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advantage rarely compensates for the strategic-voting and cost of ruling at the 
national level, it can do so in some localities.  In provinces where the party’s support 
was low to start with, because the erosion in its votes due to strategic-voting and 
cost of ruling will be proportionately lower as well, the incumbency advantage 
would be able to offset them.  Therefore, the vote loss suffered by an incumbent 
party is likely to be higher in those provinces where its support was highest in the 
previous election and lower in those where its support was lowest.  Indeed, in seven 
of the ten provinces in which 2007 AKP vote shares were lowest (between 12 and 
31 percent), the party’s vote share either increased or dropped by less than 3 
percentage points.14  In contrast, in eight of the ten provinces in which the AKP vote 
shares were highest in 2007 (between 62 to 71 percent), the party’s vote losses 
ranged between 15 and 36 percentage points.15   
 It is ironical that, despite the AKP vote losses being lowest in region 1, an 
impression is ingrained in the minds of the Turkish public that the party’s losses 
were largest there.  This was partially due to the maps presented by the news media 
after the election, similar to the one given in Figure 3, showing the CHP or the MHP 
as the number one party in many of the provinces along the Mediterranean, Aegean 
and western Marmara coastline.   
 
Figure 3: Party with the highest vote share in 2009  
  Source: Author’s computations utilizing data sources given in Table 1. 
 
The truth is that, although the AKP came second in most of them, in eight of 
the eleven provinces along this coastline, the party either gained votes or lost less 
than 3 percentage points between 2007 and 2009, whereas the party’s nationwide 
                                                 
14 The seven provinces are the following: Tunceli, Muğla, Şırnak, Mersin, Aydın, Tekirdağ, 
and İzmir. 
15 The eight provinces are the following: Bingöl, Erzurum, K.Maraş, Malatya,  Kayseri, 
Adıyaman, Ağrı, and Yozgat. 
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vote loss was 8.19 percent.16  Another reason for the misconception was the articles 
which evaluated the 2009 election results relative to the one in 2004.  This can be 
justified on the grounds that both these elections were for local administrations.  
However, it ignores the political realignment that has taken place after 2002.  As can 
be observed from Tables 4 through 6, the realignment essentially reached its peak in 
2004 in region 1, but in 2007 in regions 2 and 3.  Comparisons with 2004 ignore 
votes gained by the AKP between 2004 and 2007 and lost between 2007 and 2009 in 
regions 2 and 3.  
 The CHP and the MHP have noticeable presences only in regions 1 and 2.  
The Democratic Society Party (DTP) clearly is a regional and ethnic-based party, 
receiving its votes mainly in region 3 where the Kurds are concentrated.  The vote 
share of CHP+DSP increased in regions 1 and 2 but their small share in region 3 
remained essentially unchanged.  The vote share of the MHP on the other hand, 
remained about the same in region 1, increased in region 2, and decreased in region 
3.  DTP raised its votes substantially in region 3 but its small shares in other two 
regions increased slightly as well.  The vote shares of the other parties were 
substantially smaller in all regions.  Nevertheless, among them, the Felicity Party 
(SP) managed to raise its share in all regions, especially in region 3.  The DSP, 
ANAP, and GP appear to be on the way to extinction.  The DP’s performance was 
only a little better than these parties.  Although its share in the first two regions 
continued to decline, it rose slightly in region 3.   
 To measure the differences in inter-party vote traffic, and in the effects of 
incumbency, strategic voting and the economy in various parts of the country, the 
vote equations are estimated for each region separately.  To gain in efficiency the 
equations for each region are estimated as a system, using the Seemingly Unrelated 
Regressions procedure of Zellner (1962).   The systems estimated include equations 
for the AKP, CHP+DSP, MHP, DP, and SP in regions 1 and 2, and for AKP, 
CHP+DSP, DP, SP, and DTP, in region 3.  Vote shares of these parties exceeded 
four percent either in 2007 or 2009 in the respective regions.  On the right hand side 
of each equation, besides the lagged value of the dependent variable, 2007 vote 
shares of the AKP, DP and GP are included in regions 1 and 2, and of AKP in region 
3.  The vote losses of the parties mentioned were more than one percent of the total 
vote in the respective regions.  Dummy variables are entered for Eskişehir in the 
region 1 equations, for Elazığ, Sivas, and Rize, in the region 2 equations, and for 
Tunceli, in the region 3 equations.  The first one of these was added to capture the 
coattails effect there of the popular mayor of Eskişehir who was able to bring to his 
party, the DSP, a vote share that is 8.5 times the party’s national share and 10.5 
times its regional one.  In Elazığ, the favorite son candidacy of the former DP leader 
had brought extra votes to his party in 2007.  The coefficients of the dummy for that 
province will give us hints as to the fate of those votes, after he relinquished his 
                                                 
16 The eight provinces are the following: Mersin, Antalya, Muğla, Aydın, İzmir, Çanakkale, 
Edirne, and Tekirdağ. 
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leadership and political involvement in the 2009 election.  In Sivas, the Grand Unity 
Party (BBP) received a lot of sympathy votes, after its leader, a parliament member 
from that province, died in a helicopter crash a few days before the election, while 
campaigning.  Rize is the home province of the former ANAP leader, where he ran 
as an independent candidate in 2007 and received substantial amount of votes, when 
his party did not contest the election.   How those votes were distributed among the 
parties in 2009 can be answered with the help of the coefficient estimates of the 
dummy variable for that province.  Finally, in Tunceli, an independent candidate, 
not affiliated with any party, had received about a third of the votes in 2007.  For 
which party or parties this parliament member’s 2007 supporters cast their votes in 
2009 can be determined through the parameter estimates of this dummy.        
 Tables 7 through 9 present the estimated vote equations for the regions in 
question.   The columns of the tables indicate the origins of the votes captured, and 
the rows the destinations of the votes shed by the respective political parties.  
According to the the AKP07 row of table 7, in 2009, the AKP was able to retain 
slightly less than two-thirds of those who voted for it in the previous election, losing 
about a third of them to the MHP and about seven percent to the SP.  While 
shedding some of its voters to other parties in this region, the AKP seems to have 
captured about a third of the DP voters.  This indicates that the political realignment 
continued to some extent in the 2009 election, but it amounted to only a few percent 
of the votes.  The MHP and the SP managed to keep their own previous supporters, 
in addition to what they captured from the AKP.  The CHP+DSP maintained their 
2007 votes and captured those of GP which was absent from the election.  Indeed of 
the five provinces in the region in which the former increased their vote share in the 
double digits, four are where the GP had its highest vote shares in the 2007 
election.17   
 According to the information presented in Table 8, the AKP lost about 43 
percent of its votes in region 2, which was shared between the MHP and the SP, 
with the MHP receiving a little more than the SP.  However, the large and positive 
constant term in the AKP equation and the negative ones in the MHP and SP 
equations indicate that the vote shifts from the AKP to the MHP and the SP were 
larger than 43 percent in those provinces in which the vote share of the AKP was 
high in 2007.  While capturing part of the AKP supporters, the MHP and SP were 
able to hold on to their 2007 supporters.  The MHP, in addition, took almost all of 
the former GP, and probably a third of the former DP supporters.  The CHP+DSP 
appear to have not gained any additional votes, just kept their old supporters.  The 
extra votes attracted by the former DP leader in 2007 in Elazığ seem to have largely 
gone to the SP in 2009.  The sympathy votes the BBP received in Sivas appear to 
have come mainly at the expense of the AKP and partially of the CHP+DSP.  Most 
of those who supported the former ANAP leader in Rize when he ran as independent 
                                                 
17 These provinces are: İzmir, Zonguldak, Kırklareli, and Edirne 
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there in 2007, voted for the ANAP in 2009, but a small portion of them appear to 
have gone to the AKP.18  
 Table 9 gives some clues as to where the voters who deserted the AKP in 
region 3 ended up.  The estimates in the table show that only about a third of the 
2007 AKP supporters have remained with the party in 2009.  About a third of them 
went to the SP, a quarter to the DTP, and one-tenth to the DP.  Large and significant 
constant terms (with opposite signs) in the AKP and the SP equations however show 
that the vote transfers from the AKP to the SP was lower than indicated, in 
provinces with lower AKP vote shares in 2007 and higher than indicated in those 
with higher AKP vote shares in 2007.  The votes cast for the independent candidate 
in Tunceli in 2007 appears to have gone mainly to the CHP+DSP in 2009 but the SP 
seems to have captured some of them as well.  It is also evident that the votes 
received by the independent candidates in that province in 2009 came at the expense 
of the DTP.19 A comparison of the AKP equations in tables 7 through 9, reveal 
that the constant terms rise and the slope terms fall as we move from region 1 
towards region 3.  Thus we can say that the incumbency advantage, and the 
combined impact of strategic-voting, cost of ruling, and economic conditions, tends 
to rise, as we go from the west of the country to the east.  It appears that incumbency 
gives a greater advantage in less developed parts of the country where reliance on 
government is higher and on the market lower.  It makes sense also for strategic 
voting to make a bigger difference in the east.  In this region, where small parties 
receive substantial amount of votes but not enough to surpass the 10 percent 
threshold applicable in parliamentary elections, it is natural for their supporters to 
chose other parties in the Grand National Assembly elections but return to fold in 
local elections.  Yet another pattern revealed by the estimated equations is that 
within each region, the incumbent party’s vote losses tend to be higher where the 
party’s support is higher, just as was the case across the three regions.                      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
18 The vote share of the ANAP was 13 percent in Rize, as opposed to about one percent 
nationally and regionally. 
19 The AKP increased its votes substantially in Tunceli but, as explained above, that is 
captured by the large constant term in its equation. 
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Table 7:   Estimated vote equations: cross-provincial data of region 1  
E q u a t i o n s  Independent 
Variables AKP09 CHP09+ DSP09 MHP09 DP09 SP09 
Constant 
 
5.84 
(0.96) 
-3.83 
 (0.45) 
-13.85 
(2.00) 
0.83 
(0.17) 
-1.13 
(0.59) 
AKP07 
 
0.66 
(5.37) 
0.10 
(0.74) 
0.32 
(2.57) 
-0.00 
(0.05) 
0.07 
(1.75) 
CHP07+DSP07 
 
 1.06 
(7.95) 
   
 
MHP07 
 
  1.16 
(13.89) 
  
 
DP07 
 
0.34 
(1.56) 
-0.05 
(0.23) 
-0.02 
(0.10) 
0.70 
(4.03) 
-0.07 
(1.11) 
GP07 
 
0.13 
(0.44) 
1.03 
(3.10) 
0.09 
 (0.30) 
-0.02 
(0.07) 
-0.00 
(0.03) 
SP07 
 
    1.08 
(8.77) 
ESKİŞEHİR 
 
-1.89 
(0.54) 
11.83 
(3.14) 
-6.86 
(2.09) 
-2.42 
(0.85) 
-1.15 
(1.10) 
Notes: For the definitions of variables, see Section 5.  For the provinces included in region 1, see the notes to Figure 
1.  The equations are estimated as a system of Seemingly Unrelated Regressions, using the Zellner (1962) procedure.  
The system weighted R-square is 0.78.  The numbers in parantheses are the t-values in absolute value.  The dark-
shaded cells indicate significance at one percent level, the medium-shaded cells, at five percent level, and the light-
shaded cells, at ten percent level, in one-tailed tests.   
Source: Author’s computations. 
                      
Table 8:  Estimated vote equations: cross-provincial data of region 2 
E q u a t i o n s   Independent 
Variables AKP09 CHP09+DSP09 MHP09 DP09 SP09 
Constant 
 
11.25 
(2.16) 
5.34 
(0.83) 
-10.86 
(1.19) 
4.63 
(0.85) 
-6.58  
(1.57) 
AKP07 
 
0.57 
  (7.14)   
-0.09 
(0.96) 
0.24 
(1.89)    
-0.05 
(0.60) 
0.18 
(2.78) 
CHP07+DSP07 
 
 
 
1.15 
(11.22) 
   
MHP07 
 
  0.92 
(8.78) 
  
DP07 
 
0.21 
(0.81) 
-0.08 
(0.28) 
0.44 
(1.22) 
0.65 
(2.39) 
-0.16 
(0.75) 
GP07 
 
-0.01 
(0.05)  
0.25 
(0.84) 
0.94 
(2.30) 
-0.18 
(0.62) 
-0.15 
(0.65) 
SP07 
 
 
 
   1.45 
(6.57) 
ELAZIĞ 
 
-2.26 
(0.43) 
0.68 
(0.12) 
-1.61 
(0.22) 
-10.26 
(1.87) 
7.91 
(1.88) 
SİVAS 
 
-10.38 
(3.19) 
-4.68 
(1.35) 
-3.88 
(0.84) 
-2.56 
(0.75) 
-3.12 
(1.18) 
RİZE 
 
5.67 
(1.76) 
3.59 
(1.02) 
2.82 
(0.60) 
-1.11 
(0.33) 
-0.86 
(0.33) 
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Notes:For the definitions of variables, see Section 5.  For the provinces included in region 2, see the 
notes to Figure 1.  The equations are estimated as a system of Seemingly Unrelated Regressions, using 
the Zellner (1962) procedure.  The system weighted R-square is 0.77.  The numbers in parantheses are 
the t-values in absolute value.  The dark-shaded cells indicate significance at one percent level, the 
medium-shaded cells, at five percent level, and the light-shaded cells, at ten percent level, in one-tailed 
tests.    
Source:Author’s computations. 
 
Table 9:   Estimated vote equations:cross-provincial data of region 3  
E q u a t i o n s Independent 
Variables 
AKP09 CHP09 + DSP09 DP09 SP09 DTP09 
Constant 
 
15.28 
(3.34) 
-0.45 
(0.24) 
-2.19 
(0.49) 
-10.22 
 (3.07) 
-10.11 
(1.09) 
AKP07 
 
0.33 
(3.56) 
0.04 
(1.32) 
0.13 
(1.83) 
0.34 
(3.97) 
0.24 
(1.85)   
CHP07+DSP07 
 
 
 
 
0.50 
(2.75) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
DP07 
 
 
 
 0.21 
(0.46) 
  
SP07 
 
 
 
  1.41 
(0.89) 
  
DTP07 
 
    1.36 
(10.84)   
TUNCELİ 
 
0.33 
(0.06) 
 
23.79 
(9.05) 
1.11 
(0.24) 
5.71 
(1.43) 
-9.94 
(1.57) 
Notes:For the definitions of variables, see Section 5.  For the provinces included in region 3, see the 
notes to Figure 1.  The equations are estimated as a system of Seemingly Unrelated Regressions, using 
the Zellner (1962) procedure.  The system weighted R-square is 0.93.  The numbers in parantheses are 
the t-values in absolute value.  The dark-shaded cells indicate significance at one percent level, the 
medium-shaded cells, at five percent level, and the light-shaded cells, at ten percent level, in one-tailed 
tests.    
 Source:  Author’s computations. 
 
6. Conclusions 
 
Understanding the historical patterns in voting behavior is of great help in 
explaining and predicting the outcomes of elections.  When such patterns are taken 
into account, in light of the economic voting literature, the vote loss experienced by 
the AKP in 2009 is not unusual at all, and was predictable beforehand.  Much of it 
can be attributed to the typical response shown to poor economic conditions and the 
typical strategic-voting observed in local administrations elections.20  Both of these 
                                                 
20 In that regard, attempts by the prime minister to turn the election climate to that of a 
general election makes perfect sense from his point of view.  On the other hand, his 
persistent defense of the argument that the global crisis will affect Turkey only tangentially 
was probably a tactical error on his part.  If he blamed the “blond and blue-eyed people” for 
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are temporary set backs.  It appears at the time of this writing that the impact of the 
economy is very likely to be reversed in the 2011 election and that of the strategic 
voting against the incumbent party will become much milder, with that election 
being a parliamentary one.       
Implications of the economic voting literature prove helpful also in 
understanding the geographical patterns observed in the Turkish voter behavior.  In 
2009, the AKP came on top in 62 of the 81 provinces but lost votes in every 
province except six.  The party’s losses tended to rise with a movement from the 
west of the country to the east, both in percentage points and in proportion.  
Interestingly the support for the party shows a similar tendency.  It is quite natural 
for vote losses due to cost of ruling and strategic voting to be larger in the east 
where the party’s support is much higher, and to exceed its incumbency advantage 
by a larger margin.  Although there is a tendency for the incumbency advantage to 
get larger towards the east, it appears that it is largely offset by the combined impact 
of strategic-voting, cost of ruling, and the economic conditions, which rises also 
with a move from the west to the east.         
The voters who deserted the AKP appear to have moved to the DP, SP and 
DTP in the mid-eastern and south-eastern provinces and to the MHP and SP in the 
rest of the country.  Ideologically, the MHP, SP and DP are all right-wing 
conservative parties like the AKP.  The DTP, on the other hand, is a left-wing 
Kurdish-nationalist party.  It appears that some of the conservative Kurds, who 
supported the AKP in 2004 and 2007, but deserted it in 2009 to protest its handling 
of the economy and other matters, and to balance its power, voted in 2009 on the 
basis of their ideology and switched to the SP or the DP.  Some of them on the other 
hand voted on the basis of their ethnic identity and chose the DTP instead.  The 
latter group may have wanted to register their displeasure with the increased cross-
border operations in their region by the military after the 2007 election, which the 
AKP government blocked prior to that election.  They may have wanted also to 
signal to the AKP that they find its initiatives to solve the ethnic issues in the south-
east and east not sufficient.21   
With the exception of the MHP, the parties which were at the receiving end 
of the votes lost by the AKP have not been able to reach the 10 percent nationwide 
                                                                                                                              
the crisis as the Brazilian president did, perhaps he may have reduced the impact of the 
economy on his party’s vote, somewhat. 
21In that regard, the AKP faces a challenge no other major party in Turkey faces.  It is the 
only party at this point with an appeal across the entire country.  It receives votes from both 
ethnic Kurds and Turks.  Thus unless it is careful, the party risks losing at one end while 
trying to gain at the other.  To avoid that, it has to find a delicate balance in its reforms such 
that they satisfy the Kurds without alienating the Turks.  The CHP and MHP on the other 
hand are almost non-existent in the East and for all practical purposes receive votes only 
from the Turks.  The parties such as the DTP, its predecessors and its successor, Peace and 
Democracy Party (BDP) have a notable presence only in the East and get support only from 
the Kurds.  So these parties do not face the dilemma the AKP does. 
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threshold since 1999.  They are not likely to do so in the near future either.  
Consequently, unless they enter the next election in partnership with other parties, as 
DSP did in 2007, or field independent candidates, as the DTP did in the same 
election, they are not likely to keep the votes they have gained in the 2009 election.  
Perhaps it is revelatory to note that in the same regions they increased their votes in 
the 2009 local elections, the SP and the DP were able to do so in the 2004 local 
administrations election as well.  However they were not able to hold on to those 
gains in the following parliamentary election (see Tables 4, 5, and 6).  Much of their 
gain in local elections no doubt has to do with the extra strategic voting in elections 
which does not result in a change in the government, and voters voting for their first 
preferences without fear of wasting their ballots, in elections where no nationwide 
thresholds apply.     
 The political life of the ANAP ended practically in 2007 but its official end 
occurred after the 2009 election when it merged with the DP.  The GP votes were on 
a sharp decline since its first impressive showing in 2002, and for all practical 
purposes, the party vanished from the political scene when it did not even participate 
in the 2009 election.  Its 2007 votes were shared by other opposition parties.  
CHP+DSP received them in the west, and the MHP captured them in the central part 
of the country.22  It is interesting that the CHP and DSP shared with the MHP, 
whatever remained of the GP.  This can be taken as a manifestation of these parties 
appealing to the same base now.  The center of gravity for the CHP and the MHP 
has been moving towards the west over time, and they are both turning into regional 
parties with negligible presence in the east and south-east where Kurds are 
concentrated.  One reason for this could be that the platforms of CHP and DSP are 
becoming increasingly similar to that of the MHP and GP.  They too exhibit a lack 
of enthusiasm for the reforms and compromises necessary for the European Union 
accession, for the settlement of the Cyprus and Kurdish minority issues, and the 
democratization of the constitution.  Furthermore, in comparison with that of the 
AKP, their positions in regards to economic and social policies are more 
nationalistic and anti-global.  
The vote share of the DP, the last of the former center-right parties, has 
dwindled but not totally disappeared.  It lost some of its supporters to the AKP in the 
west, to the MHP in the center, while capturing some votes back from the AKP in 
the mid-east and south-east.  This can be interpreted as continuation of the political 
realignment in 2009.  However it involved very few votes now to make any 
noticeable difference.   
The analysis presented in this paper indicates a return to normalcy in 
Turkish politics with the 2009 election.  It suggests that the patterns which prevailed 
during most of the multi-party democratic era once again can be relied upon to 
                                                 
22 The GP did not have much of a support in the east and south-east to be shared. 
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understand and predict the outcomes of elections.23  Other lessons that can be drawn 
from the current study is that unless the entire political record is considered, one can 
easily reach wrong conclusions, not realizing they are based on outliers, and that one 
can make better sense of political outcomes, taking advantage of the economic 
voting literature.    
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Table A-1: Nationwide political and economic conditions, and electoral outcomes:  
                   1950-2009 
 
 
Table A-1 notes: 
a/  A:   National Assembly general election. 
 B:    National Assembly by election. 
 S:    Senate election 
 L:    Local (Provincial General Assembly) election. 
      S+B: Senate election plus National Assembly by election (only in provinces    
where no Senate election was held simultaneously). 
Vote Share 
(%) 
  
Previous Vote 
Share 
(%) 
 
Time in Power 
since last election     
(Years) 
 
Election 
Date 
 
 
 
Election 
Type a 
 
Provinc
es 
covered 
by the 
election 
 
 
 Incumbent 
 Parties b 
Major     
Incumb.
Party 
All 
Incumb.   
Parties 
Major     
Incumb.
Party 
All 
Incumb.   
Parties 
Major     
Incumb. 
Party 
All 
Incumb. 
Parties 
 
Growth 
Rate e 
(%) 
 
Inflation 
Rate f  
(%)  
May. 14, 1950 A 63 of 63 CHP 39.45 39.45   3.75 3.75 -3.5  -0.2  
Sep.  16, 1951 B 17 of 63 DP 52.73 52.73 52.68 52.68 1.25 1.25  9.2    4.3 
May    2, 1954 A 64 of 64 DP 57.61 57.61 52.73 52.73 2.50 2.50  4.8     4.9 
Oct.  27, 1957 A 67 of 67 DP 47.88 47.88 57.61 57.61 3.50 3.50  3.6 20.3 
Oct.  15, 1961 A 67 of 67 Military   36.73 g 36.73    41.09 g 41.09 g 1.25 1.25 -0.7   4.2 
Nov. 17, 1963 L 67 of 67 CHP/YTP/ 
CKMP 
36.21 45.73 36.73 64.41 2.25 1.50  6.8   5.7 
June   7, 1964 S 26 of 67 CHP 40.85 40.85 36.21 36.21 0.50 0.50  4.2   4.1 
Oct.  10, 1965 A 67 of 67 AP/CKMP/ 
YTP/MP 
52.87 65.10 50.28 56.81 h 0.50 0.50  0.1   4.2 
June   7, 1966 S + B 24 of 67 AP 56.49 56.49 52.87 52.87 0.75 0.75  4.6  5.2 
June   2, 1968 L 67 of 67 AP 49.06 49.06 56.49 56.49 2.00 2.00  3.7   5.3 
Oct.  12, 1969 A 67 of 67 AP 46.53 46.53 49.06 49.06 1.25 1.25  2.5   6.5 
Oct.  14, 1973 A 67 of 67 AP/CGP 29.82 35.08 46.53 53.11  4.00 2.50  1.7 19.2 
Oct.  12, 1975 S + B 27 of 67 AP/MSP/    
CGP/MHP 
41.34   52.98j 29.82 50.26 0.75 0.50  4.4 21.0 
June   5, 1977 A 67 of 67 AP/MSP/  
CGP/MHP 
36.88 53.73 41.34 52.98 j 1.75 1.75  4.7  19.4 
Dec.  11, 1977 L 67 of 67 AP/MSP/  
MHP 
37.08 50.59 36.88 51.86 0.75 0.75  1.3 23.7 
Oct.  14, 1979 S + B 29 of 67 CHP/CGP/ 
DP2 
29.22 31.59 41.81 43.42 1.75 1.75 -2.2 68.4 
Nov.   6, 1983 A 67 of 67 Military         
Mar. 25, 1984 L 67 of 67 ANAP 41.48 41.48 45.14 45.14 0.25 0.25  4.1 48.2 
Sep.  28, 1986 B 10 of 67 ANAP 32.12 32.12 41.48 41.48 2.50 2.50  3.9 40.3 
Nov. 29, 1987 A 67 of 67 ANAP 36.31 36.31 32.12 32.12 1.25 1.25  7.1 33.6 
Mar. 26, 1989 L 71 of 71 ANAP 21.80 21.80 36.31 36.31 1.25 1.25 -0.6 70.8 
Oct.  20, 1991 A 74 of 74 ANAP 24.01 24.01 21.80 21.80 2.50 2.50  0.9 58.7 
Mar. 27, 1994 L 76 of 76 DYP/SHP 21.44 35.01 27.03 47.78   2.25 2.25  2.8 77.5 
Dec. 24, 1995 A 79 of 79 DYP/CHP 19.18 29.89 21.44 39.64 l 1.75 1.75  5.3 87.2 
Apr. 18, 1999 A 80 of 80 ANAP/DSP 
/DTP m 
13.22 35.99 19.65   34.29 n 2.00 1.75 -0.1 70.3 
Nov.  3, 2002 A 81 of 81 DSP/MHP/ 
ANAP 
  1.22 14.71 22.19 53.39 3.50 3.25  1.8  41.3 
Mar. 28, 2004 L 81 of 81 AKP 41.67 41.67 34.28 34.28 1.25 1.25  4.9 20.6  
July  22, 2007 A 81 of 81 AKP 46.58 46.58 41.67 41.67 3.25 3.25  4.5   7.8 
Mar. 29, 2009 L 81 of 81 AKP 38.39 38.39 46.58 46.58 1.75 1.75 -1.2 10.4 
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In instances when different types of elections are held simultaneously or almost  
simultaneously, the priority for inclusion in the sample was given first to the National 
Assembly general elections, next to the Provincial Council elections, then to the Senate 
elections, and last to the by elections.  The Senate and by elections were given lower 
priorities because, unlike the National Assembly general elections and local elections, they 
did not cover the whole country.  The Senate elections involved only a third of the provinces 
and only a third of the seats in the Senate that were subject to election.  The coverage of by 
elections were even less, about 15-27 percent of the provinces when they did not coincide 
with a Senate election.  When the Senate and by elections were held simultaneously, their 
results were aggregated to increase the coverage of the country.  In such aggregation, for 
provinces where the two elections overlapped, only the results of the Senate election is 
considered.   
 
b/The party listed first in the table is the major incumbent party.  The Turkish acronyms used 
in the table and the parties they represent are as follows: 
 
 CHP:  Republican People’s Party 
 DP:  Democrat Party 
 YTP:      New Turkey Party 
 CKMP:  Republican Peasant’s Nation Party 
 AP: Justice Party 
 MP: Nation Party 
 CGP: Republican Reliance Party 
 MSP: National Salvation Party 
 MHP: Nationalist Action Party 
 DP2: Democratic Party 
 ANAP: Motherland Party 
 DYP: True Path Party 
 SHP: Social Democratic People’s Party 
 DSP: Democratic Left Party 
 DTP: Democrat Turkey Party 
AKP: Justice and Development Party . 
 
c/ 0.25 times the number of quarters since last election during which the major incumbent 
party was in power majority of time, either alone or with other parties. 
d/ 0.25 times the number of quarters since last election during which all incumbent parties 
were in power simultaneously majority of time, with or without other parties. 
e/ The growth rate of per capita real GDP during the one-year period preceeding the election, 
gt , is computed as follows: 
gt =   m Gt  + (1-m) Gt-1 
where Gt and Gt-1 are the growth rates for the year in which the election is held, and the one 
prior to that. 
m= 0.00  if the election is held between January 1 and February 14, 
m= 0.25 if the election is held between February 15 and May 15, 
m= 0.50 if the election is held between May 16 and August 15, 
m= 0.75 if the election is held between August 16 and November 15, 
m= 1.00 if the election is held between November 16 and December 31,  
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except for elections in  1965, 1975 and 1984, when m is taken as unity because the 
governments then were either not in power during the year preceding the election or were in 
power for less than half a quater.   
For years 1948 and 1968 growth rate of per capita real GNP is substituted for missing growth 
rate figures for per capita real GDP. 
f/ The inflation rate in GDP deflator during the one-year period preceding the election, pt, is 
computed in a similar way as gt as explained above.  For the years 1948, and 1968 however,  
rate of change in GNP deflator is substituted for missing figures for the rate of change in 
GDP deflator.  
g/ Republican People’s Party (CHP) was treated as the incumbent party.  This party was 
allied with the military regime at the time and supported it or at least perceived by the public 
as such.  The votes cast for the other parties in 1961 were largely in opposition to the military 
regime and Republican People’s Party.    
h/Vote share of only AP, CKMP and YTP.  MP did not enter the 1964 election. 
j/ Vote share of only AP, MSP and MHP.  CGP did not enter the 1975 election. 
k/Vote share of only CHP and CGP.  DP2 did not enter the 1979 election. 
l/ Vote share of DYP, CHP and SHP in 1994.  SHP merged with CHP in 1995.  So SHP and 
CHP are treated as one party. 
m/ A minority government formed by DSP was in power during the four months preceding 
the election but it was just a caretaker government.  For that reason the coalition government 
in power prior to that for over eighteen months is taken as the incumbent. 
n/  Vote share of only ANAP and DSP.  DTP was formed in 1997 and thus did not enter the 
1995 election. 
Sources of data:  The dates and the coverage of elections, and the make-up of governments 
and their time in power, are determined using the information given in Tuncer (2002, 2007, 
and 2009) and Tuncer and Kasapbaş (2004).All vote shares are computed by the author, 
using the data provided by Tuncer (2002, 2007, and 2009) and Tuncer and Kasapbaş (2004).  
In aggregating the Grand National Assembly By and Senate elections held in 1975 and 1979, 
the province level vote data provided by the Turkish Statistical Institute (TurkStat) of the 
Republic of Turkey was also utilized.  The growth rates are computed by the author, as 
explained in note (e) above, using the data provided by the TurkStat on per capita real GDP 
growth rate for all years except 1948 and 1968.  For 1948 and 1968, per capita real GNP 
growth rate is substituted for the missing growth rate in per capita real GDP.  In computing 
the former, the population growth rate, provided by the TurkStat, and the real GNP growth 
rate, provided by the State Planning Organization (SPO) of the Republic of Turkey are 
utilized.  The GDP series, from which the annual growth rates are obtained, is 1987 based for 
the years prior to 1998, and 1998 based for years after 1999. The inflation rates are computed 
by the author, using the rate of change in GDP price deflator for all years except 1948 and 
1968, for which the rate of change in GNP price deflator was used instead.  The GDP 
deflator is obtained by dividing nominal GDP by real GDP, both provided by the TurkStat.  
The rate of change in GNP deflator is provided by the SPO.  
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        TABLE A-2. Vote shares of political parties in the 2009 provincial council elections 
 
PROVINCE AKP      SP     MHP     CHP    DSP     DP    ANAP   DTP   INDEP.
 
ADANA 
ADIYAMAN 
AFYON 
AĞRI 
AMASYA 
ANKARA 
ANTALYA 
ARTVİN 
AYDIN 
BALIKESİR 
BILECİK 
BİNGÖL 
BİTLİS 
BOLU 
BURDUR 
BURSA 
ÇANAKKALE 
ÇANKIRI 
ÇORUM 
DENİZLİ 
DİYARBAKIR 
EDİRNE 
ELAZIĞ 
ERZİNCAN 
ERZURUM 
ESKİŞEHİR 
GAZİANTEP 
GİRESUN 
GÜMÜŞHANE 
HAKKARİ 
HATAY 
ISPARTA 
İÇEL 
İSTANBUL 
İZMIR 
KARS 
KASTAMONU 
KAYSERİ 
KIRKLARELİ 
KIRŞEHİR 
KOCAELİ 
KONYA 
KÜTAHYA 
MALATYA 
MANİSA 
K.MARAŞ 
MARDİN 
MUĞLA 
MUŞ 
NEVŞEHİR 
NİĞDE 
ORDU 
RİZE 
SAKARYA 
SAMSUN 
 
29.81    2.58   27.23   22.99   2.27   3.16   0.48   8.04   0.61 
48.74   12.26    8.06   14.76   2.14   2.58   1.68   5.90   0.10 
43.50    5.38   26.77   13.30   2.03   4.80   0.30   0.00   0.18 
27.47   10.37    2.37    2.22   1.18   7.65   1.67  36.88   3.89 
39.37    4.40   19.42   22.61   3.95   3.97   0.67   0.00   0.44 
37.40    1.99   24.04   29.69   0.71   0.83   0.38   0.57   0.04 
31.13    2.84   21.22   32.78   1.05   4.25   1.52   1.89   0.10 
36.74    1.79   11.81   25.48   8.19   7.58   0.64   0.00   2.19 
26.02    1.26   23.58   28.13   2.86  11.81   0.26   3.21   0.10 
34.96    2.81   22.21   23.74   3.75   8.18   0.97   0.75   0.11 
34.36    3.51   20.66   24.88   2.76   9.35   0.54   0.00   1.26 
42.40   20.12    2.51    3.34   0.57   3.94   1.54  20.72   1.25 
31.26   13.95    4.89    2.98   3.77   7.69   1.13  27.52   1.92 
46.64    8.15   13.42   22.12   2.13   3.86   0.30   0.00   0.00 
36.88    6.02   20.23   21.39   3.87   7.56   0.44   0.00   0.43 
42.98    5.05   16.19   22.01   1.50   5.72   2.01   1.54   0.06 
35.73    1.26   23.08   29.19   3.07   4.25   0.96   0.40   0.56 
44.57    5.55   32.79    3.90   0.58   4.79   0.00   0.00   3.57 
47.64    4.22   17.41   21.52   2.76   2.15   1.55   0.00   0.00 
35.51    1.36   21.65   28.02   1.92   5.46   0.47   1.34   0.16 
30.51    1.71    0.78    1.02   0.54   3.46   0.58  59.20   0.72 
25.94    1.73   12.83   42.06   6.50   6.07   0.93   0.54   0.96 
46.11   13.79   16.71    6.95   0.73   4.80   0.54   3.96   1.03 
41.28    4.48   19.99   17.86   8.68   1.72   0.14   0.53   0.00 
48.03    8.61   20.21    3.48   2.02   3.22   1.20   5.58   2.08 
36.08    2.16   11.82   10.19  32.48   3.11   0.48   0.12   0.12 
48.55    4.70    8.54   22.76   1.01   4.66   0.39   5.17   0.26 
41.24    6.05   16.78   23.05   3.54   3.62   1.26   0.00   1.13 
44.41   11.36   24.33    7.90   0.43   6.74   0.70   0.00   0.40 
21.15    2.12    0.49    0.00   0.28   2.00   0.00  71.51   0.00 
32.37    2.92   19.63   27.23   4.44   6.61   0.52   1.47   0.00 
35.54    4.77   27.98    9.40   1.57  16.06   0.28   0.34   0.22 
25.44    1.38   31.27   22.64   3.78   2.22   0.73  10.22   0.10 
40.08    7.33    7.33   33.50   2.55   0.87   0.48   4.63   0.01 
29.00    1.10    9.70   48.26   2.71   2.53   0.47   3.58   0.15 
35.66    3.77   17.02   14.24   3.52   4.18   0.51  18.53   0.54 
44.69    2.02   29.37   10.17   2.82   7.01   0.08   0.00   1.03 
51.08    4.13   25.17    9.52   1.17   1.73   0.36   0.00   0.25 
25.96    0.62   10.87   45.21   7.82   5.65   1.15   0.39   0.34 
35.87    4.82   24.76   24.36   0.74   3.57   0.41   1.65   0.31 
42.08   11.76    9.90   26.60   1.05   4.05   0.33   1.83   0.00 
54.72    9.54   19.21    8.23   1.40   1.98   0.21   0.91   0.21 
51.50   11.12   16.56    8.77   1.71   6.02   0.82   0.00   0.23 
50.16   15.49    7.64   16.99   1.06   1.29   0.98   1.37   0.73 
35.61    1.92   26.27   18.56   4.12   6.63   1.11   2.93   0.00 
51.29    3.74   19.35    9.28   1.73   3.27   1.43   0.94   0.18 
27.21    3.89    0.81    3.52   0.47   7.52   3.02  43.72   7.96 
26.10    0.59   20.01   34.25   5.26  10.07   0.29   1.26   0.09 
28.67    6.99    2.00    3.29   1.51   3.16   0.35  42.37   5.59 
46.35    5.37   25.50   11.92   2.81   3.83   0.46   0.00   0.00 
39.87    3.84   25.08   19.79   0.81   3.09   0.79   0.00   0.00 
42.76    3.96   17.13   12.92  13.64   2.16   0.88   0.00   0.60 
48.34    6.71   12.02   10.38   2.51   2.82  13.30   0.00   0.46 
42.71    9.75   27.89   10.33   0.83   4.00   1.12   0.55   0.63 
45.81    4.07   23.07   14.82   2.64   5.44   0.58   0.00   0.11 
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TABLE A-2: Vote shares of political parties in the 2009 provincial council elections 
 (Continued) 
PROVINCE   AKP     SP     MHP    CHP    DSP     DP    ANAP   DTP   INDEP.
 
SİİRT 
SİNOP 
SİVAS 
TEKİRDAĞ 
TOKAT 
TRABZON 
TUNCELİ 
ŞANLIURFA 
UŞAK 
VAN 
YOZGAT 
ZONGULDAK 
AKSARAY 
BAYBURT 
KARAMAN 
KIRIKKALE 
BATMAN 
ŞIRNAK 
BARTIN 
ARDAHAN 
IĞDIR 
YALOVA 
KARABÜK 
KİLİS 
OSMANİYE 
DÜZCE 
 
34.79   5.57    3.09   3.28   2.31   6.91   1.16  37.58   1.22 
42.38   3.52   13.65  21.55   4.66   8.23   1.06   0.00   0.36 
33.07   5.54    8.70  12.66   1.51   0.45   0.11   0.00   0.33 
27.23   2.54   12.46  36.96   6.57   9.34   0.72   1.58   0.23 
42.95   7.09   21.09  12.73   5.94   3.85   0.32   0.00   0.00 
45.11   9.13   14.13  18.03   1.94   5.16   1.02   0.00   1.35 
19.70   0.24    1.23  18.62  13.56   0.67   0.37  19.92  10.36 
39.52  16.23    5.48   2.75   0.53  11.09   0.55  19.00   2.52 
34.95   2.67   29.73  23.62   2.64   2.44   0.49   0.00   0.00 
34.19   5.94    1.45   2.50   1.77   1.96   1.36  48.08   0.49 
47.85   5.26   29.48   8.48   0.64   3.50   0.43   0.00   0.00 
38.33   5.70    7.17  31.54   7.59   5.72   0.54   0.00   0.00 
52.92   3.87   27.11   8.37   1.23   3.82   0.41   0.00   0.00 
42.24  19.46   20.58   4.61   0.25   4.75   0.00   0.00   1.38 
44.80   7.87   21.17  18.07   1.96   1.84   0.58   0.00   0.00 
35.32   7.85   22.30   9.75   2.20  16.71   0.97   0.00   0.00 
35.44   4.11    0.87   1.63   1.18   0.88   0.21  52.81   0.69 
27.91   2.64    1.11   1.71   2.52   0.28   0.00  59.88   1.98 
46.25   3.91   19.90  18.39   3.91   3.83   0.70   0.00   0.00 
29.62   2.08    7.96  20.31  17.10   5.06   1.89  12.95   0.00 
22.54   2.07   16.66   4.32   0.79   5.49   2.16  32.37  12.48 
32.32   4.76   10.26  21.31   3.29  15.97   3.63   2.75   2.53 
39.46   7.73   20.73  14.59   1.98  11.63   0.89   0.00   0.00 
47.40   2.57   23.60  11.80   0.65   3.74   0.67   0.00   1.02 
35.29   1.54   42.53  12.15   0.79   2.75   0.41   0.90   0.15 
44.55   9.73   23.91  10.80   2.31   3.21   0.90   0.00   1.01 
Source: Author’s computations using the data provided by Tuncer (2009)  
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          TABLE A-3: Vote shares of political parties in the 2007 parliamentary election 
 
PROVINCE   AKP     SP     MHP       CHP       DP       DTP      INDEP.
 
ADANA 
ADIYAMAN 
AFYON 
AĞRI 
AMASYA 
ANKARA 
ANTALYA 
ARTVİN 
AYDIN 
BALIKESİR 
BILECİK 
BİNGÖL 
BİTLİS 
BOLU 
BURDUR 
BURSA 
ÇANAKKALE 
ÇANKIRI 
ÇORUM 
DENİZLİ 
DİYARBAKIR 
EDİRNE 
ELAZIĞ 
ERZİNCAN 
ERZURUM 
ESKİŞEHİR 
GAZİANTEP 
GİRESUN 
GÜMÜŞHANE 
HAKKARİ 
HATAY 
ISPARTA 
İÇEL 
İSTANBUL 
İZMIR 
KARS 
KASTAMONU 
KAYSERİ 
KIRKLARELİ 
KIRŞEHİR 
KOCAELİ 
KONYA 
KÜTAHYA 
MALATYA 
MANİSA 
K.MARAŞ 
MARDİN 
MUĞLA 
MUŞ 
NEVŞEHİR 
 NİĞDE 
ORDU 
RİZE 
SAKARYA 
SAMSUN 
SİİRT 
 
36.89   1.56   22.91     22.83     5.28      5.49      5.92 
65.31   2.02    5.24     13.95     3.49      5.88      8.04 
53.72   1.79   21.00     12.34     6.80      0.00      0.32 
63.02   0.94    3.87      2.57     3.02     22.91     24.36 
47.10   2.39   15.26     25.62     5.52      0.00      0.39 
47.52   1.21   15.16     27.97     2.84      0.62      1.25 
34.02   1.31   19.97     29.08     9.84      1.53      4.37 
37.78   1.89   10.97     28.43    13.93      0.00      0.05 
29.19   1.07   25.89     24.40     9.94      2.49      2.75 
41.47   2.04   15.84     24.32     8.86      0.47      0.72 
39.97   4.00   17.89     23.24     7.69      0.00      0.08 
71.12   1.85    2.54      4.15     4.22     14.08     14.28 
58.82   1.61    5.73      8.65     1.74     15.74     21.77 
54.89   3.61   12.18     14.68     6.62      0.00      1.44 
41.44   2.51   18.63     21.31     9.69      0.00      0.08 
50.75   3.94   14.33     18.42     5.63      0.87      1.08 
35.35   0.93   20.67     25.68     7.49      0.00      0.14 
60.74   2.35   21.57      5.36     5.17      0.00      0.08 
57.40   1.65   10.77     22.25     3.82      0.00      0.11 
43.03   0.99   17.73     21.98     8.75      0.46      6.76 
40.90   0.69    2.45      2.01     5.22     42.71     47.01 
20.72   1.65   16.83     35.83     9.57      0.00      0.33 
57.20   3.72    6.45      7.07    20.69      2.95      3.06 
54.33   2.01   11.43     23.92     1.22      0.00      4.46 
68.29   3.23   13.14      4.72     2.62      4.85      5.37 
44.48   1.60   15.61     25.38     7.07      0.00      0.18 
59.25   1.42   11.38     17.57     2.40      3.65      5.05 
51.28   2.41   15.98     16.18     3.90      0.03      4.79 
60.64   4.31   19.26      7.94     4.00      0.00      0.18 
33.49   0.52    1.85      3.54     1.99     49.04     56.24 
40.84   1.13   16.79     31.15     4.12      1.79      2.18 
43.87   2.87   23.67     13.34    12.30      0.00      0.13 
27.16   0.85   30.56     24.67     5.47      6.10      6.60 
45.16   3.04   10.44     26.99     3.07      3.77      5.87 
30.50   0.88   13.88     35.46     5.19      2.95      3.97 
41.18   1.32   20.03     13.37     4.07     12.89     15.63 
49.43   1.70   17.43     13.97     9.82      0.00      0.15 
65.73   2.06   15.44      9.82     2.96      0.00      0.44 
20.17   0.77   15.87     40.12     9.01      0.00      0.20 
44.26   1.63   25.53     15.35     2.14      0.00      6.74 
49.26   8.30   10.45     19.38     5.33      1.80      2.05 
65.31   4.40   13.01      8.15     5.92      0.63      0.91 
62.35   2.87   15.83      8.73     6.71      0.00      0.11 
66.72   1.64    7.56     18.87     1.33      1.45      1.83 
40.94   1.52   20.63     19.31     9.07      1.50      1.72 
68.00   1.46   12.39      9.83     4.43      0.57      1.35 
44.06   1.23    1.33      6.92     5.59     34.31     38.77 
26.33   0.60   20.32     34.49    10.06      0.44      0.56 
38.60   1.97    2.31      3.13     6.12     33.59     45.81 
55.72   3.34   18.32     15.81     3.23      0.00      0.16 
48.60   2.98   18.85     15.85     7.41      0.00      1.77 
55.79   1.39   14.75     15.91     5.20      0.02      0.16 
53.66   3.42    5.87      7.62     3.21      0.00     22.71 
53.14   6.18   11.38      9.23     6.15      0.23      9.37 
57.90   2.36   12.18     17.06     5.84      0.06      0.34 
48.78   0.96    2.77      3.46     2.91     25.25     39.51 
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TABLE A-3. Vote shares of political parties in the 2007 parliamentary election  
(Continued) 
PROVINCE   AKP   SP        MHP       CHP      DP        DTP      INDEP. 
SİNOP 
SİVAS 
TEKİRDAĞ 
TOKAT 
TRABZON 
TUNCELİ 
ŞANLIURFA 
UŞAK 
VAN 
YOZGAT 
ZONGULDAK 
AKSARAY 
BAYBURT 
KARAMAN 
KIRIKKALE 
BATMAN 
ŞIRNAK 
BARTIN 
ARDAHAN 
IĞDIR 
YALOVA 
KARABÜK 
KİLİS 
OSMANİYE 
DÜZCE 
44.04  1.85     12.32     24.36     9.07      0.00      0.00 
55.47  3.83      9.45     15.92     1.99      0.00     11.21 
29.34  1.30     13.18     34.41     8.19      0.61      0.73 
51.95  3.08     17.05     18.95     3.08      0.00      2.88 
56.76  5.57     14.06     13.65     6.24      0.00      0.23 
12.27  0.39      6.41     16.58     0.89     27.31     59.96 
59.78  2.20      5.38      4.75     6.32     11.82     20.14 
43.28  1.78     19.57     22.45     5.16      0.00      0.14 
53.22  1.30      3.24      4.06     2.74     30.35     32.60 
62.43  1.80     17.82     12.24     2.35      0.00      0.19 
41.02  4.32      7.77     24.40    13.83      0.00      0.07 
63.43  1.58     16.05     10.40     4.25      0.00      0.74 
60.75  8.59     19.33      2.91     5.91      0.00      0.00 
51.32  3.03     18.65     15.18     6.69      0.00      0.09 
57.99  1.82     22.50     11.50     3.16      0.00      0.00 
46.41  1.91      0.94      3.91     5.77     38.69     39.42 
26.93  0.16      2.87      6.72     8.61     51.44     51.83 
38.57  2.47     21.69     22.70     7.71      0.00      0.08 
40.60  0.85      6.08     32.29     3.19      9.27      9.27 
28.91  0.28     15.15      8.36     4.27     26.79     40.53 
40.64  2.44     12.41     24.38    12.49      1.57      1.73 
54.69  4.12     13.41     13.60     6.27      0.00      0.28 
56.21  1.33     20.46     10.79     5.96      0.00      0.13 
38.71  1.28     44.90      9.71     3.32      0.00      0.04 
60.60  4.40     10.78     10.64     6.72      0.00      0.09 
 
Table A-3 notes:DTP did not enter the 2007 election but fielded independent candidates.  Vote share of the party given 
refers to the share of votes received by the candidates supported by the party.  The INDEP column in the table refers to 
the vote shares of the remaining independent candidates.  
Source: Author’s computations using the data provided by Tuncer (2009)  
 
